Tensions between Georgian and the de facto South Ossetian authorities shifted away from the borderization at Gugutiantkari to the Chorchana / Tsnelesi area at the southeastern tip of the South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line (ABL).
For about two months from the 24th of August a series of incidents, heated rhetoric and disrupted Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings occurred over essentially a territorial dispute fueled by the construction of a Georgian police post close to a South Ossetian controlled village.
According to South Ossetian authorities on the 24th of August the Georgian side was seen constructing a police post near the South Ossetian village of Tsnelisi, close to the ABL, and near the Yugostalk plant. The South Ossetian authorities called this a provocation from the Georgian side, two days before their 11th anniversary of “the recognition of the independence of the Republic of South Ossetia by the Russian Federation”. Also in the vicinity of Sinagur, more north, “construction of a site for equipping Georgian police facilities” was reported.
Plenipotentiary of the President of South Ossetia for post-conflict settlement, Murat Dzhioev, said that “according to border guards, in the region of Tsnelis village of the Znaursky district of South Ossetia, above the Yugostalk enterprise, Georgian law enforcement agencies cut down a forest, paved the way, put up a post and a Georgian flag, thereby violating the state border”. Which was echoed by Zaza Driaev of the South Ossetian Parliament as well.
On the 27th of August the South Ossetian authorities released a video (see below) which shows Georgian works on the road to the police post, illustrating their earlier statements. Despite the allegations expressed in South Ossetian “state media”, Georgian media did not pick up on this, which only happened after South Ossetians demanded the Georgian police to leave the area, eventually expressing an ultimatum for August 30th 6:00 am during the EUMM facilitated and scheduled IPRM meeting at Ergneti on the 29th of August.
The recent incidents at Gugutiantkari and Chorchana were the main talking points. The IPRM meeting was disrupted and left unfinished when the South Ossetian and Russian side decided to leave the meeting after the Georgian side refused to agree with the ultimatum to clear the police post by August 30 6:00 AM. The Georgian government confirmed this refusal the next day.
In the run-up to the IPRM meeting South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov visited Tsnelesi, with a militarized entourage and additional security forces that alarmed people in Georgia.
Meanwhile Zaza Driaev, head of the South Ossetian Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Relations earlier said “It will be fair if we set up our posts where the border of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region previously ran”.
So what is this all about exactly? Was there really a “violation of the state border” as the South Ossetians put it? What is this “where the border previously ran” about? First let’s check the map below showing the Chorchana and Tsnelisi area.
The red line is the “border” as South Ossetian authorities consider it (see below photo of their map), claiming the territory between the red and dotted purple line. The latter is the Georgian (and internationally) accepted boundary line.
The location of the (blue) Georgian police post which kicked of this situation, is in the area the South Ossetians contests is theirs. But just outside the Georgian, internationally (and EUMM) accepted administrative boundary line. Regardless how one interprets both sides, this is the root on which the South Ossetians build their accusation and case against Georgian authorities.
Sputnik recalls that a South Ossetian Commission concluded in 2018 based on its own historical research and archives that the disputed area at Tsnelesi “belongs” to South Ossetia as it was always part of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region since its creation in 1922. The Commission concluded that a “fake map” from 1982 was used for marking the (current de-facto) border.
The EUMM does not seem to be concerned by this, they consider the area as part of their mandated access. (hopefully will get some feedback on this).
We continue monitoring Chorchana/Tsnelisi area at the ABL. 24/7.Tonight we have 9 #EUMM monitors from 🇦🇹🇩🇰🇬🇷🇭🇺🇲🇨🇸🇰 out there supported by 2 🇬🇪 colleagues.
According to regular updates from our patrols to HQ everything quiet so far. pic.twitter.com/msnW7wuvRD— Erik Hoeg (@erik_hoeg) August 30, 2019
On the 5th of September, South Ossetian troops put up a police post on top of a 944m hilltop in Tbilisi controlled territory, overlooking Chorchana. This is the southwestern corner of what they consider their contested territory as illustrated in the maps above. They also started carving out an access road from Tsnelisi.
[Much more happened in the following period into October but we fast forward to January 2020]
On 14 January 2020, it was reported that South Ossetian forces have erected “illegal installations” in this area (meaning: installed fences, borderization), exactly following the line they claim is the “real border” but which is generally considered Tbilisi controlled area.
In other words: ordinary landgrab. But hardly a surprising one considering the recent past. David Katsarava visualized the works in the forested hills with a drone:
Meanwhile South Ossetian state media spins things completely different: it says a Georgian state drone violated airspace, and Georgian media and civil society is not allowed by Georgian authorities to access Georgian villages near the boundary line to assess the situation (false statements, as is obvious from the private drone recording above).
Akhalgori checkpoint
The checkpoint on the ABL near Odzisi / Mosabruni (Мосабрун) in the Akhalgori district will remain closed until Georgian authorities will leave their police post at Tsnelesi, South Ossetian de facto President Anatoly Bibilov reiterated at a reporting meeting of the Russian FSB Border Administration. This checkpoint is the most important of three, where several hundred civilians, mostly Georgians, used to cross on a daily basis.
[to be continued]
Capital Tskhinvali and Java in central South Ossetia are the main Russian military locations with multiple sites including military camps, residential compounds, large exercise areas, and storage facilities.
The south western corner of South Ossetia was the scene of tension buildup and shelling of villages in 2008. The eastern portion fell within the 15km JKPF “Conflict Zone” around Tskhinvali. The Georgian populated area (Nuli, Avnevi and Didmuha) was 100% ethnically cleansed as result of the war, with a total of nearly 1800 dislocated Georgians. Traces of the deserted and looted villages can still be seen. A relative high density of military infrastructure has been developed in the southern area of the district between 2009 and 2011.
Java / Dzau is the largest district of South Ossetia consisting mostly of high mountain territory. It also forms the entire South Ossetian border with Russia. The sole access route, the infamous Roki tunnel played a crucial role in the Russian invasion in 2008. The western flank is made up of the boundary line with Georgia proper. Here are a few populated river valleys with cross-boundary roads. Prior to the 2008 war the area around Kvemo Karzmani and Sinagur was Georgian controlled and a community of Georgians still lives here. In the northern most corner is the Mamisoni Pass, an old high mountain passage from Georgian controlled lands into Russia, passing through South Ossetia for 2km (and thus closed). It does not have any connections into South Ossetia.
The district of the capital Tskhinvali is obviously key to the Russian military presence with a large military base in the capital. The district itself hosts the longest section of the Administrative Boundary Line in the populous southern lowlands of the region, often farmland. A complicated boundary line that zigzags seemingly random through the lands of local farmers and between villages. With Georgians (or relatives) living on both sides of the boundary line. In this section most of the arrests and abductions happen, as most of the “borderization”, meant to separate communities and prevent farmers to reach their land. The presence of security forces is therefore quite strong, contrary to the Java district, but comparable with the southern section of the Znaur district and mostly near the ABL.
