Old and “fake” maps: driving territorial dispute at Chorchana

Tensions between Georgian and the de facto South Ossetian authorities shifted away from the borderization at Gugutiantkari to the Chorchana / Tsnelesi area at the southeastern tip of the South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line (ABL).

For about two months from the 24th of August a series of incidents, heated rhetoric and disrupted Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings occurred over essentially a territorial dispute fueled by the construction of a Georgian police post close to a South Ossetian controlled village.

According to South Ossetian authorities on the 24th of August the Georgian side was seen constructing a police post near the South Ossetian village of Tsnelisi, close to the ABL, and near the Yugostalk plant. The South Ossetian authorities called this a provocation from the Georgian side, two days before their 11th anniversary of “the recognition of the independence of the Republic of South Ossetia by the Russian Federation”. Also in the vicinity of Sinagur, more north, “construction of a site for equipping Georgian police facilities” was reported.

Plenipotentiary of the President of South Ossetia for post-conflict settlement, Murat Dzhioev,  said that “according to border guards, in the region of Tsnelis village of the Znaursky district of South Ossetia, above the Yugostalk enterprise, Georgian law enforcement agencies cut down a forest, paved the way, put up a post and a Georgian flag, thereby violating the state border”. Which was echoed by Zaza Driaev of the South Ossetian Parliament as well.

On the 27th of August the South Ossetian authorities released a video (see below) which shows Georgian works on the road to the police post, illustrating their earlier statements. Despite the allegations expressed in South Ossetian “state media”, Georgian media did not pick up on this, which only happened after South Ossetians demanded the Georgian police to leave the area, eventually expressing an ultimatum for August 30th 6:00 am during the EUMM facilitated and scheduled IPRM meeting at Ergneti on the 29th of August.

The recent incidents at Gugutiantkari and Chorchana were the main talking points. The IPRM meeting was disrupted and left unfinished when the South Ossetian and Russian side decided to leave the meeting after the Georgian side refused to agree with the ultimatum to clear the police post by August 30 6:00 AM. The Georgian government confirmed this refusal the next day.

In the run-up to the IPRM meeting South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov visited Tsnelesi, with a militarized  entourage and additional security forces that alarmed people in Georgia.

Meanwhile Zaza Driaev, head of the South Ossetian Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Relations earlier said “It will be fair if we set up our posts where the border of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region previously ran”.

So what is this all about exactly? Was there really a “violation of the state border” as the South Ossetians put it? What is this “where the border previously ran” about? First let’s check the map below showing the Chorchana and Tsnelisi area.

The red line is the “border” as South Ossetian authorities consider it (see below photo of their map), claiming the territory between the red and dotted purple line. The latter is the Georgian (and internationally) accepted boundary line.

The location of the (blue) Georgian police post which kicked of this situation, is in the area the South Ossetians contests is theirs. But just outside the Georgian, internationally (and EUMM) accepted administrative boundary line. Regardless  how one interprets both sides,  this is the root on which the South Ossetians build their accusation and case against Georgian authorities.

Sputnik recalls that a South Ossetian Commission concluded in 2018 based on its own historical research and archives that the disputed area at Tsnelesi “belongs” to South Ossetia as it was always part of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region since its creation in 1922. The Commission concluded that a “fake map” from 1982 was used for marking the (current de-facto) border.

The EUMM does not seem to be concerned by this, they consider the area as part of their mandated access. (hopefully will get some feedback on this).

On the 5th of September, South Ossetian troops put up a police post on top of a 944m hilltop in Tbilisi controlled territory, overlooking Chorchana. This is the southwestern corner of what they consider their contested territory as illustrated in the maps above. They also started carving out an access road from Tsnelisi.

[Much more happened in the following period into October but we fast forward to January 2020]

On 14 January 2020, it was reported that South Ossetian forces have erected “illegal installations” in this area (meaning: installed fences, borderization), exactly following the line they claim is the “real border” but which is generally considered Tbilisi controlled area.

In other words: ordinary landgrab. But hardly a surprising one considering the recent past. David Katsarava visualized the works in the forested hills with a drone:

Meanwhile South Ossetian state media spins things completely different: it says a Georgian state drone violated airspace, and Georgian media and civil society is not allowed by Georgian authorities to access Georgian villages near the boundary line to assess the situation (false statements, as is obvious from the private drone recording above).

Akhalgori checkpoint

The checkpoint on the ABL near Odzisi / Mosabruni (Мосабрун) in the Akhalgori district will remain closed until Georgian authorities will leave their police post at Tsnelesi, South Ossetian de facto President  Anatoly Bibilov reiterated at a reporting meeting of the Russian FSB Border Administration. This checkpoint is the most important of three, where several hundred civilians, mostly Georgians, used to cross on a daily basis.

[to be continued]


Abduction of eight Georgians in 24 hours near Adzvi

In the weekend of 17-18 August eight Georgians have been arrested and detained by Russian led “border guards” along the Administrative Boundary Line on two locations: seven at a church near Adzvistavi and one person near Akhalubani.

All eight have been transported to the Tskhinvali isolator. The South Ossetian side changed their narrative during the day. They claim all eight were arrested at the same location, the St George church near Adzvistavi (see map), drunk and in possession of drugs “of plant origin”.

The Foreign Ministry of Georgia stated the borderization at Gugutiantkari last week, and the abduction of Georgians this weekend near the ABL is a clear attempt at destabilizing the country.  The Deputy Foreign Minister added that he will continue to increase international pressure on Russia (but refrained from elaborating on the “how” except for mobilizing).

Annually hundreds of Georgians get arrested in a similar fashion, but this incident is extra highlighted by the unusual high number of involved people.

Tskhinvali base


The seven (young) Georgian citizens were visiting a church in the wooded hills just outside of Adzvi village to lit some candles according to one of the mothers. The church is situated between the Adzvistavi FSB base and Ghromi FSB base which covers this side of the river bank. The detained were allegedly taken to the Adzvistavi base.

Despite the boundary line used in Google Maps and OpenStreetMap, suggesting the locations are within the “South Ossetian” area, the territory is considered to be Georgian controlled. Yandex Map uses a different demarcation (see below).

Locals told Rustavi2 the situation on the ground lacks clear indication of the boundary line, causing the occupying forces randomly arresting people claiming they trespassed. This causes a lot of anxiety, as by far most alleged trespassing is unintended, often related to farming.

The youngsters were arrested around  18:00-19:00, and the hot line with the EUMM was quickly activated.

A drone video of the area and the chapel with the cars visibly parked and abandoned, was shot by David Katsarava:


Rustavi2 reported on Sunday all three cars St George church have been transferred to the Georgian authorities, and will be forensically investigated. They were released by the South-Ossetian de facto authorities to units of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.


In the morning of 18 August information was released another Georgian citizen was arrested nearby Akhalubani. He is a local from Mejvriskhevi, having been arrested previously for “border trespassing” as his uncle told Radio Tavisupleba.  Just like the other seven he has been transferred to the Tskhinvali isolator.

Radio Tavisupleba (RFE/RL) reported live from the site:


On August 20 the eight Georgians arrested and detained earlier were released by the de facto Tskhinvali authorities. After paying a fine they were handed over to Georgian authorities and returned to their homes.

The identity of the eight was also reported: Zurab Gerkeuli, Ilia Mighrijanashvili, Koba Bardiashvili, Lasha Gerkeuli, Ilia Baindurashvili, Giorgi Naskidashvili, Otar Eliauri and Soso Dvalishvili

Russian military infrastructure in Abkhazia

The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 resulted in a massive increase of Russian military presence in Georgia’s Abkhazia region. An estimated 5.000 Russian military personnel (3.500 Armed Forces, 1.500 border guards) are deployed in the region. 

This page visualizes some of the expansion of Russian presence over the years, based on public material available.


Russian military infrastructure in South Ossetia region

The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 resulted in a massive increase of Russian military presence in Georgia’s South Ossetia region. An estimated 5.000 Russian military personnel (3.500 Armed Forces, 1.500 border guards) are deployed in the region. This is a tenfold of official Russian (“peacekeeping”) presence prior to 2008 and with much stronger warfare equipment. According to the latest data just 53.000 people live in the area.

In 1992, after the Georgian-Ossetian civil war of 1991-1992, a cease-fire was reached through the Sochi Accords. This also established the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and the Joined Peacekeeping Force (JPKF). It was the start of post-Soviet Russian military presence in South Ossetia. The JPKF was commanded by the Russians, and was composed of 1.320 troops: Russian Federation (500), Georgia (320), and North/South Ossetia (500).

The six-point agreement between Russia and Georgia was signed in August 2008 to end the war after mediation by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on behalf of the EU.  This stipulated, among other things, “Russian armed forces to withdraw to the positions held before hostilities began in South Ossetia”, the source of dispute between Russia and Georgia (and most of the international community) since then.

Two weeks after the agreement was signed Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia (and Abkhazia). In September 2008 the EU and Russia worked out the six-point agreement in terms of deadlines and implementation of observer missions. It was at the press conference the separate visions on withdrawal became clear.

Medvedev said: “Russia will withdraw in full its peacekeepers from the zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the positions where they were stationed before the start of hostilities”. While Sarkozy stated: “…within a month Russia’s Armed Forces will have left Georgian territory”.  In the vision of Sarkozy that included both regions as he repeated the EU’s position on the status of the regions as inseparable parts of Georgia.

Since that moment Russia has rapidly expanded its military infrastructure in the region to host troops and equipment. In a second stage it has built compounds for the families of the military personnel on long term deployment. In March 2015 the Kremlin and the de facto leaders in South Ossetia signed an “Alliance and integration Treaty”, effectively integrating the security forces (including border security) of the Ossetians into the Russian structures. Among other things. The full merger of the Ossetian forces into the Russian forces was formalized in 2018. In other words, South Ossetia has become a colonized protectorate of Russia.

This article visualizes some of the expansion of Russian presence over the years, based on public material available.

Main military bases

Capital Tskhinvali and Java in central South Ossetia are the main Russian military locations with multiple sites including military camps, residential compounds, large exercise areas, and storage facilities.


The main base of Russia’s Armed forces in South Ossetia is the 4th Military Base on the western outskirts of capital Tskhinvali. This vast complex opened in February 2009, together with residential housing north from the base. In 2011 expansion took place on a free plot north from the base compound, and various minor expansion within the existing perimeters of the base.

In 2012 construction of a compound with family apartments was finished just south-east from the main base, and in 2013 a military compound was constructed within a city block. A substantial enlargement took place in 2015 on the west side of the base. The capacity of the base is estimated at 4.000 troops.


Java (or Dzau in Russian and Ossetian references) is the main town of the Java / Dzau district in central South Ossetia on an important junction of roads. It is also on the route from the Roki tunnel on the Russian border, the sole access road from Russia. The town is outside of the 15 km conflict zone as determined by the JCC, and was under control of the South Ossetians by the time the 2008 war broke out.

Russia secretly rebuilt the supposedly disbanded Ugardanta military base here since 2006 outside of the JCC mandate and international monitors. The area  was outside of international oversight. The base played an important strategic role in Russia’s invasion in 2008. Java maintained its importance for strategic deployment of Russian troops and equipment after the war; the military infrastructure rapidly developed into the second largest in South Ossetia.

Border Guard compounds

Along the Administrative Boundary Line a string of sites have been constructed over the last decade in the post-2008 period, mostly between fall 2009 and 2011. These stations take care of patrolling  and monitoring the ABL, adding physical barriers (such as barbed wire, fences and more recently trenches). The border guards are (mostly) Russian and serving under FSB command. Dozens of times per year locals (mostly Georgians) are arrested and detained by the border guards for trespassing the (mostly unmarked) ABL. The arrested persons generally get transported to Tskhinvali or other stations for detention and ransom.  Most of the sites have helipads. A walk through per administrative district below.

Kornisi / Znauri District

The south western corner of South Ossetia was the scene of tension buildup and shelling of villages in 2008. The eastern portion fell within the 15km JKPF “Conflict Zone” around Tskhinvali.  The Georgian populated area (Nuli, Avnevi and Didmuha) was 100% ethnically cleansed as result of the war, with a total of nearly 1800 dislocated Georgians. Traces of the deserted and looted villages can still be seen. A relative high density of military infrastructure has been developed in the southern area of the district between 2009 and 2011.

Java / Dzau District

Java / Dzau is the largest district of South Ossetia consisting mostly of high mountain territory. It also forms the entire South Ossetian border with Russia. The sole access route, the infamous Roki tunnel played a crucial role in the Russian invasion in 2008. The western flank is made up of the boundary line with Georgia proper. Here are a few populated river valleys with cross-boundary roads. Prior to the 2008 war the area around Kvemo Karzmani and Sinagur was Georgian controlled and a community of Georgians still lives here. In the northern most corner is the Mamisoni Pass, an old high mountain passage from Georgian controlled lands into Russia, passing through South Ossetia for 2km (and thus closed). It does not have any connections into South Ossetia.

The difficult terrain and the limited points of potential interaction with Georgian controlled land result in few compounds of Russian security forces.

Tskhinvali District

The  district of the capital Tskhinvali is obviously key to the Russian military presence with a large military base in the capital. The district itself hosts the longest section of the Administrative Boundary Line in the populous southern lowlands of the region, often farmland. A complicated boundary line that zigzags seemingly random through the lands of local farmers and between villages. With Georgians (or relatives) living on both sides of the boundary line. In this section most of the arrests and abductions happen, as most of the “borderization”, meant to separate communities and prevent farmers to reach their land. The presence of security forces is therefore quite strong, contrary to the Java district, but comparable with the southern section of the Znaur district and mostly near the ABL.

The Didi Liakhvi river gorge, north from Tskinkvali leading up to Java, was prior to the 2008 war a Georgian populated area under Georgian control. A strategic position where a lot of (pre-war) exchanges of fire took place. Nowadays the villages  are deserted and looted, which can still be seen from satellite images. This area has been ethnically cleansed with more than 9000 IDP’s. Patara Liakhvi river valley in the central-eastern part of the Tskhinvali District was a Georgian populated area as well, which has been ethnically cleansed resulting in more than 6000 IDP’s.


Akhalgori / Leningor District

South Ossetia District Akhalgori / Leningor

The eastern most district of South Ossetia is the closest to the Georgian capital Tbilisi, a predominantly Georgian populated area, especially along the Ksiani river valley, the central river of the district. It is a generally mountainous area, with the one exception to the southern most point.

The southern point is an area that often raises publicity with borderization and arrests. Also, the ABL runs the closest to the central East-West highway a distance of just 300 metres.  It is here that two Border Guard station are concentrated as a clear signal of Russian presence, with obscured observation posts in the landscape.

[to be continued – work in progress]