In August 2019 a territorial claim of the separatist Republic of South Ossetia on Georgian controlled territory escalated into a security crisis, after Georgian authorities constructed a police observation post in Georgian controlled territory near the conflict line. The course of the so-called “border” in the area between South Ossetian controlled Tsnelisi and Georgian controlled Chorchana is disputed by South Ossetia. The crisis led to a de facto South Ossetian annexation of Georgian administered territory. This page is a chronological overview of developments since August 2019 (last updates at the bottom of the page), including backgrounds on various aspects.
General overview
The root of the dispute is the territorial claim the separatist authorities of South Ossetia assert on a forested area outside of the generally maintained conflict line, in so-called “Tbilisi administered territory” (TAT). It concerns a total area of roughly 3.5 square kilometer, between the South Ossetian controlled village Tsnelisi (called Uista by the South Ossetians) and Georgian controlled Chorchana, an area located at the southwestern corner of the separatist republic. The map below shows the area the South Ossetians claim in addition to what they already effectively controlled.
Territorial dispute Tsnelisi - Chorchana The green line shows the line of control and boundary in this segment as it was upheld and interpreted by Georgia and international mediators. The red line indicates the so-called "border" as claimed by South Ossetia. The hatched pink area indicates what South Ossetia effectively annexed in 2019 as result of the crisis.
The separatist republic of South Ossetia claims that the 1922 founding decree of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in the Georgian Soviet Republic included this territory within its administrative borders. It considers the 1922 decree as the base of its claimed territory and borders, as successor of the autonomous oblast that was abolished in December 1990. Since the Georgian government denies the existence of the republic, they simply waive the South Ossetian claim, maintaining “the occupation line is just a notion”.
In 2019 the simmering territorial claim evolved into a major crisis, triggered by a new observation post of the Georgian police constructed in this area near Tsnelisi. This was propelled into an escalation by the South Ossetian side, a few days after borderization by Russian controlled troops at Gugutiantkari, that stirred emotions on the Georgian side. A series of incidents on the ground, heated rhetoric and meetings of the EU and OSCE mediated Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) were some of the direct and visible elements of the dispute, which remained unresolved by 2026.
The South Ossetian authorities, assisted by Russian occupation troops, escalated in September 2019 by moving into Georgian administered territory, outside of the generally held conflict line. They claimed the police post was illegally built on what they projected to be South Ossetian territory and took physical control of the area. They built outposts and border demarcation in the forests of Chorchana, along the line they held was the true “border”. In the process Georgia lost control of roughly one square kilometer of territory, which was physically annexed by South Ossetia, and henceforth, got under Russian control.
Since 2025 the Georgian Dream government used the case to prosecute former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, who was held responsible for the loss of territory. In 2021 Gakharia resigned for other reasons, and went into opposition against the Georgian Dream government. His prosecution was considered to be politically motivated.
Administrative Boundary Line and occupation line International mediators often refer to the conflict line and de-facto border of South Ossetia as the 'Administrative Boundary Line' (ABL). It is a reference to the line of control between territory administered de-facto by separatist South Ossetia and the territory administered by the government of Georgia. The latter area is also called 'Tbilisi Administered Territory' (TAT). Georgia, many observers and politicians speak of the occupation line to reflect the role of Russia as occupier of Georgian territory. Henceforth, both terms ABL and occupation line are used in this page interchangeably. The ABL is generally only mentioned in this page when directly quoting statements and the likes.
The beginning
According to the South Ossetian authorities on 24 August 2019,1RES Agency, 24 August 2019, КГБ Южной Осетии призвал грузинских силовиков отказаться от провокаций the Georgian side constructed a police post on a hill above the Yugostalk marble plant close to the occupation line and near the South Ossetian controlled village Tsnelisi. The South Ossetian authorities called this a provocation from the Georgian side in the run-up to the South Ossetian “independence” celebrations, which they have on the 26th of August. They also reported “construction of a site for equipping Georgian police facilities” in the vicinity of Sinaguri, a village more north. This was not confirmed by Georgian authorities at this point, but the South Ossetian side repeated the accusation of the construction on 4 September.2RES Agency, 4 September 2019, Parliamentarians of South Ossetia left for Sinagur to study the situation on the state border

Plenipotentiary of the President of South Ossetia for post-conflict settlement, Murat Dzhioev, said that “according to border guards, in the area of Tsnelisi village of the Znaur district of South Ossetia, above the Yugostalk enterprise, Georgian law enforcement agencies cut down a forest, paved the way, put up a post and a Georgian flag, thereby violating the state border”.3RES Agency, 24 August 2019, South Ossetia is demanding from Georgia to immediately stop the provocation in the border zone This was echoed by Zaza Driaev of the South Ossetian Parliament.4Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, 28 August 2019, Если даже случится небольшая перестрелка, это опять приведет к конфликту и обострению ситуации на госгранице, – Заза Дриаев
Ultimatum
On the 27th of August the South Ossetian authorities released a video, which showed Georgians working on the road to the police post, illustrating their earlier statements.5RES Agency, 27 August 2019, КГБ Южной Осетии сообщает о продолжающихся провокациях на госгранице Despite the allegations expressed in South Ossetian propaganda media, Georgian media did not pick up on the entire commotion. That only happened after South Ossetia demanded at the EUMM facilitated and regularly scheduled IPRM meeting in Ergneti on the 29th of August that the Georgian police should leave the area, by expressing an ultimatum.6RES Agency, 28 August 2019, South Ossetian parliamentarians are concerned about the aggravation of the situation on the border7Civil Georgia, 30 August 2019, Georgian Officials Say Situation around Disputed Police Checkpoint ‘Stable’
The incidents at Gugutiantkari and Chorchana were the main talking points at this IPRM meeting. The South Ossetian and Russian side however decided to leave the meeting prematurely when the Georgian side refused to agree with the ultimatum to clear their police post by August 30 6:00 AM. The Georgian government confirmed this refusal a day after the meeting.8Georgian Journal, 30 August 2019, Why so called South Ossetian delegation gave ultimatum to the Georgian side?
The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was obviously concerned about the evolving crisis and the security environment. As impartial observer and mediating party they were initially not dragged into the dispute itself. But that was to change in September 2019. Their mandate formally covers the entire internationally recognized Georgian territory, including the de-facto separated areas. In practice the monitors observe everything from Tbilisi controlled territory, being denied access to Tskhinvali controlled territory.
Erik Hoeg, 30-08-2019: “We continue monitoring Chorchana/Tsnelisi area at the ABL. 24/7. Tonight we have 9 #EUMM monitors from 6 countries out there supported by 2 Georgian colleagues. According to regular updates from our patrols to HQ everything quiet so far.”9Twitter, 30 August 2019, Erik Hoeg, head of EUMM mission on 30 august 2019
Delineation and demarcation
Yelena Panin, a Russian Duma deputy of United Russia said that “South Ossetia had always been an independent state. There is no need to talk about some kind of peaceful return of South Ossetia to Georgia, especially after the tragic events of 2008”.10RES Agency, 29 August 2019, There is no need to talk about some kind of peaceful return of South Ossetia to Georgia, – the State Duma deputy The Russian Foreign Ministry described the construction of the Georgian police post as “provocative actions” carried out “against the background of Tbilisi’s repeated refusal of Tskhinvali’s proposal to begin negotiations on delimitation and demarcation of the border.”11RES Agency, 30 August 2019, МИД РФ выразил серьезную озабоченность эскалацией напряженности на границе Южной Осетии и Грузии
In the run-up to the IPRM meeting South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov visited Tsnelisi,12RES Agency, 28 August 2019, South Ossetia has every opportunity to withstand the provocations, – President with a militarized entourage and additional security forces which alarmed people in Georgia.13RES Agency, 28 August 2019, South Ossetia has every opportunity to withstand the provocations, – President14DF Watch, 29 August 2019, South Ossetia sends extra forces to demarcation line as Georgia builds new checkpoint Meanwhile Zaza Driaev, head of the South Ossetian Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Relations earlier said “It will be fair if we set up our posts where the border of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region previously ran”.15RES Agency, 28 August 2019, South Ossetian parliamentarians are concerned about the aggravation of situation on the border
The “border”
So what does Driaev mean with “where the border previously ran”? And was there really a “violation of the [state] border” as the South Ossetians claim? First, let’s check the situation on the ground in 2019 on the map below. The location of the Georgian police post (blue) is in Tbilisi administered area, in accordance with the generally held interpretation of the Administrative Boundary Line or occupation line. However, South Ossetian authorities insist the post is on their territory, as they claim a different course of the “border”.
The green line shows the line of control and boundary in this segment as it was upheld and interpreted by Georgia and international mediators. The red line indicates the so-called "border" as claimed by South Ossetia. The hatched red/pinkish area indicates what South Ossetia effectively annexed in 2019 as result of the conflict.
Archives and history
In 2018 a commission installed by the de facto Parliament of South Ossetia performed a “historical and archival research”. It was specifically tasked to solve “the issue of the border demarcation” after appeals from residents in the Tsnelisi village. The news site Civil.ge quoted Georgian Reconciliation minister Ketevan Tsikhelashvili that “the Commission is a provocation”, which could “aggravate the security and humanitarian situation on the ground.”16Civil Georgia, 24 June 2018, Tskhinvali Makes Territorial Claims Tsnelisi locals however, complained parts of their village are located outside of the “border of the republic”. The Commission concluded the disputed area near Tsnelisi “belongs to South Ossetia”, as “it was always part of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region since its creation in 1922”. The Commission concluded among other things that a “fake map” from 1982 was used for marking the (current de-facto) “border”.
More in the fold-out explainer below.
The 1922 decree
In mid-September 2019, the co-chairs of the Geneva International Dialogue (GID) were handed in Tskhinvali the Soviet decree on the establishment of the South Ossetian Autonomous District in Tskhinvali in 1922.17Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 15 September 2019, „საზღვრის“ დამრღვევი დამკვირვებლები და დაძაბული ვითარება ჩორჩანაში According to the South Ossetian side, the decree designated the contested forest to be part of the autonomous oblast and therefore belongs to its self-declared successor, the “Republic of South Ossetia”.

South Ossetian representative Murat Dzhioev told the c-chairs of the GID that they “have confirming material that this territory is part of South Ossetia. As South Ossetia was formed within the borders of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and legislatively, these borders were approved by the decree on the formation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast of 20 April 1922. This is the basic document from which we depart when designating our borders, and we don’t take one step that would be contrary to the law.”18RES Agency, 17 September 2019, Co-chairs of the Geneva discussions arrived in Tskhinval
So what does the decree say about the course of the border in this particular area? In article 2, section b about the western border and section c about the southern border it says:19All-Georgian Central Executive Committee of Soviets and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, 20 April 1922, Decree No2 On the formation of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia (pdf)
b) … crosses the right tributary of the Kvirila River, northeast of the village of Perevi; passes north of the village of Perevi, crosses the Kvirila River, east of elevation 2170 [ft], abutting Mount Peranga at elevation 5201; extends along the spurs of this mountain west of Mount Denrula; crosses the latter and runs along the Kaprebis Seri Ridge to an elevation of 4172; continues along the upper reaches of the Charatkhevi River and further along the branches of the Kaprebis-Seri Ridge, west of the Lopan River;
c) from the south, the border line continues along the Chorchani-Tsnelisi road, crosses the Lopan River, below Tsnelisi, turns northeast: passes above the village of Atotsi, crosses the Prone River below the village of Okona; extends southeast of the Prone River, crosses the left tributary of the Prone River below the village of Kvatetri; then crosses the Prone River (Kornisskaya) above the village of Dvani: ….
In other words, in the decree there is a lot of freedom of interpretation of the particular area near Chorchana and Tsnelisi. The decree mentions the border runs along the upper reaches of the Charatkhevi/Cheratkhevi river and further along the ridge west of the Lopani – but it does not say at what distance. The contested area is a bit further south and is exactly where the ridge stops being a ridge, dissolving in foothills, while not mentioning the exact waypoints or hilltops in the way the decree mentions specific others farther north. Without additional detailed clarification or maps, the decree is not a very solid proof of the South Ossetian claims.

Juggling with maps
Both Russian and separatist South Ossetian representatives attempted to determine the (administrative) boundaries of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. For that purpose they used reference material such as maps of different years for demarcation activities that suits their benefit. According to the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI)20IDFI, 26 October 2015, Creeping Occupation of Georgia Following the 2008 War
“the Russian occupational regime is planning to go back to the old administrative borders of the South Ossetian autonomous province which existed during Soviet times. In order to define the so-called borders (occupation lines) of Georgia’s occupied territories, the border-guards of the Russian Federation and the separatist regime use the topographic maps of the general staff of the Soviet military published between 1976-1986.
“First of all, there were numerous topographic maps of the Soviet general staff and they have been published throughout different times. At the same time, they differed in the way they defined the boundaries of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District. For example, to define the administrative borderline in Gori region, the Russian side uses the topographic map of 1988 which portrays the locations as of 1984.”
“Secondly, during the demarcation and establishment of the administrative border after the 2008 war, the Russian and Ossetian sides did not take into account the complex administrative outline of the South Ossetian district. As a result, much of the Georgian population lost access to the lands that they utilized on every-day basis.”
The latter sums up the complications of today’s reality.
September 2019
In early September a South Ossetian/Russian troops constructed a police post on a hilltop in Tbilisi administered territory, overlooking Chorchana.21Civil Georgia, 6 September 2019, In Tit-for-Tat Move, Tskhinvali Places ‘Border Signs’, Flag in Chorchana-Tsnelisi Area22Agenda.ge, 5 September 2019, De facto Tskhinvali building road to new ‘police post’ in Tsnelisi, erects flag and ‘border sign’ This is the southwestern corner of territory Tskhinvali claims in this dispute (“point 17”, 944 m, see maps below and above).23RES Agency, 5 September 2019, Пограничный пост обозначен «точкой 17» и находится на линии прохождения госграницы Южной Осетии, – КГБ They also carved out an access road from Tsnelisi through the forest, up to 1.3 kilometer into Tbilisi administered territory.
The construction of the police post coincided with an extra IPRM meeting in Ergneti that was called to mediate in this crisis.24IPN, 6 September 2019, სუს-ის წარმომადგენელი – ჩორჩანასა და წნელისის მიმდებარედ, დე ფაქტო “სამხრეთ ოსეთის” საგუშაგო ქართული მხარის მიერ კონტროლირებად ტერიტორიაზეა განთავსებული Both sides accused each other of illegal and provocative activities in the disputed territory. South Ossetian authorities demanded the Georgians would give up the police outlook near Tsnelisi as a condition to “remove tensions”.25IPN, 13 September 2019, იგორ კოჩიევი – ქართული პოლიციის პოსტის მოხსნა პრობლემას გადაწყვეტდა Which the Georgian side refused. 26IPN, 13 September 2019, სუს-ის წარმომადგენელი – ერგნეთში შეხვედრაზე კატეგორიულად მოვითხოვეთ ცენტრალური ხელისუფლების მიერ კონტროლირებად ტერიტორიაზე უკანონო აქტივობის შეწყვეტა Moreover, the South Ossetian side did not elaborate how they would “remove tensions” if the Georgians would fulfill their request.
The South Ossetian political class meanwhile requested assistance from Moscow: “The South Ossetian Parliament asks the Russian Federation Council and the State Duma to hold inter-parliamentary consultations to develop a unified policy to promote de-escalation, restore territorial integrity and ensure the security of South Ossetian citizens.”27IPN, 7 September 2019, De facto parliament of Tskhinvali asks assistance from Russia
EUMM
After the IPRM meeting in Ergneti on the 13th of September the EUMM released a statement,28EUMM, 16 September 2019, Situation at the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia saying:
Beginning in January this year [2019] the Mission noted paint markings on trees in the area between Tsnelisi and Chorchana. The Mission assesses these as a feature of ‘borderisation’. However, no actor has claimed responsibility for these markings.
Between 20 and 24 August a new Georgian observation post was established on the outskirts of the village of Tsnelisi by the MIA Special Tasks Department. According to EUMM findings, the post is located some 240 metres away from the ABL and on Tbilisi-administered territory (TAT) in accordance with the traditionally understood run of the ABL in that area.
Security actors from South Ossetia have in the last week established new positions and installed a number of borderisation features, including ‘green signs’ and flags on the TAT side of the ABL as traditionally understood in this area. The features are up 1.3 kilometres beyond the ABL. In the meantime Georgian MIA units have also reinforced their presence in the Chorchana forest area.
South Ossetian Envoy to the President, Murat Dzhioev, condemned the “illegal visits” of the EU Monitoring Mission to the Georgian police post and dragged the mission into the conflict: “EU observers are unlawfully visiting the right-bank side of the Tsnelisi settlement. They have no mandate on the territory of South Ossetia, so every visit is unlawful”.29TASS, 17 September 2019, South Ossetia expresses protest to EU mission for visiting its border area

GID
The co-chairs of the Geneva International Discussion (GID) travelled to Tskhinvali to discuss the ongoing closure of crossing points by the South Ossetian side.30Civil Georgia, 15 September 2019, Geneva Talks Co-Chairs on Closure of Tskhinvali Crossing Points For the South Ossetian side this closure was highly connected with the Chorchana – Tsnelisi conflict: reopening them was conditional to the Georgian removal of the police post near Tsnelisi. Through the IPRM and GID dialogue formats international stakeholders insisted on the separation of these issues. While in Tskhinvali, the co-chairs of the GID were given an explanation on the 1922 decree and their vision on course of the border according to this decree (see above).
Self-inflicted damage
Former Georgian minister of Reconciliation and Civic Equality, Paata Zakareishvili, voiced criticism towards the Georgian government: “The government’s silence is troubling, and this is contributing to the creation of various myths. Their incompetence shows that they do not know the situation and do not know how to act in the direction of conflict management, I am not talking about a solution anymore, we have no dreams, they cannot manage it”.31IPN, 11 September 2019, პაატა ზაქარეიშვილი ჩორჩანასთან მიმდინარე მოვლენებზე – შემაშფოთებელია ხელისუფლების დუმილი და ეს ხელს უწყობს სხვადასხვა მითების შექმნას
Effectively Zakareishvili blamed the government for self-inflicted damage. He said the Georgians should not have constructed the police post without consultation at the IPRM meetings in Ergneti. Regardless whether the lookout is legit on Georgian administered territory. It predictably fuelled tensions and escalation from the South Ossetian side.
He also said the escalation with South Ossetian outposts and borderization on Tbilisi administered territory “is an extremely dangerous and destructive act that seriously damages the security environment and poses additional problems for indigenous people on both sides of the occupation line.”
Note from the editor: It appears the Georgian authorities planned to construct two police posts in this section, starting with the northern one, instead of the southern. This has proven to be a tactical blunder, as it gave the Russian / South Ossetian side the opportunity to shortcut the Georgian strategy of securing control through the available access road from the village of Tsnelisi into the Chorchana forest.
October 2019
The fifth IPRM meeting in Ergneti in a month, entirely focused on the Chorchana crisis, did not produce any results, illustrating the deep stalemate.32Agenda.ge, 1 October 2019, 5th Ergneti meeting: occupation forces refuse to dismantle illegal ‘police-posts’ or open ‘checkpoints’33Civil Georgia, 2 October 2019, Yet Another Technical Meeting Held in Ergneti Over Disputed Police Checkpoint34RES Agency, 1 October 2019, The agreement has not been reached: the Georgian party refuses to remove the post in Tsnelis A week later, at the 49th round of Geneva International Discussions (GID) the impasse on various dossiers continued.35Civil Georgia, 10 October 2019, 49th Round of Geneva International Discussions36Agenda.ge, 10 October 2019, Developments at occupation line discussed at 49th round of Geneva Int’l Discussions South Ossetian officials reiterated the need “to work on the delimitation of the South Ossetian-Georgian [state] border”.37RES Agency, 11 October 2019, In Geneva South Ossetia called on Georgia to remove the illegal roadblock in the village of Uista Which got support from Moscow.38RES Agency, 1 October 2019, The aggravation on the border of Georgia and South Ossetia will be discussed at the Geneva discussions on Transcaucasia
Throughout the middle of October contradictionary claims were voiced by Georgian activists and officials. The “Power in Unity” activist group claimed that borderization was pursued by the South Ossetians in the direction of Kobi village. This was denied by the Georgian State Security Service,39Agenda.ge, 16 October 2019, State Security Service refutes new ‘borderisation’ activities at occupation line yet they reiterated there were continued “provocative activities” in the area. According to a local villager occupation forces did move across the Lamushuristskali River,40IPN, 15 October 2019, გამყოფ ხაზთან მდებარე სოფლების – ჩორჩანას და ყობის განაპირას, საოკუპაციო ძალების წარმომადგენლები „ბორდერიზაციის“ სამუშაოებს აწარმოებენ which is the generally held boundary here.
Subsequently the South Ossetian side claimed a group of Georgian “intelligence scouts” attempted “to penetrate into the territory of South Ossetia”, at night.41RES Agency, 19 October 2019, Georgian scouts were discovered while trying to infiltrate South Ossetia No visual proof was provided, nor specific coordinates. It was denied by the Georgian State Security Service as misinformation.42IPN, 18 October 2019, სუს-ის განცხადებით, ცხინვალის საოკუპაციო რეჟიმის მიერ გავრცელებული ინფორმაცია, რომ ქართული სადაზვერვო ჯგუფი ე.წ. სამხრეთ ოსეთის ტერიტორიაზე გადასვლას ცდილობდა, დეზინფორმაციაა და სინამდვილეს არ შეესაბამება The controversial actions by “Power in Unity” led South Ossetian authorities into accusing Georgian police, EUMM and activists of coordinating “in order to achieve specific political goals”.43RES Agency, 21 October 2019, South Ossetia is conducting the planned works to demarcate the border line with Georgia, – KGB

EUMM arrest
On the 24th of October a new low was hit when an EUMM patrol was stopped and held by armed South Ossetian security forces in Tbilisi administered territory.44Civil Georgia, 24 October 2019, EUMM Monitors ‘Briefly’ Detained in Chorchana-Tsnelisi Area45Agenda.ge, 24 October 2019, EUMM says its ‘unarmed civilian monitors’ detained by ‘South Ossetian security personnel’ This was the first time since the early days of the mission in 2008 an arrest like this happened. The statement of the mission was clear:46EUMM, 24 October 2019, Unarmed civilian Monitors of the EU Monitoring Mission – Georgia detained by South Ossetian security personnel
“The Mission is still looking into the details concerning the incident, which happened in an area understood to be on Tbilisi-Administered Territory in accordance with the traditional interpretation of the Administrative Boundary Line in that area.
Following recent security developments, EUMM has significantly increased its patrolling to support stability in the Chorchana-Tsnelisi area. The EUMM is deeply concerned about cases in which armed security actors prevent EUMM Monitors from conducting their daily activities in accordance with the mandate.”
In a clear attempt of misleading propaganda and disinformation by South Ossetian officials the observers were accused of “violating the state border” and of lying about “getting lost”.47RES Agency, 24 October 2019, The EU mission observers violated South Ossetia’s state border48RES Agency, 24 October 2019, Georgian special services actively continue the policy of system provocations, – KGB The incident happened a day before a scheduled IPRM meeting in Ergneti.49Agenda.ge, 25 October 2019, 6th meeting in Ergneti: occupation forces say tension will be eased when Georgian police post is removed50Civil Georgia, 25 October 2019, Developments in Chorchana-Tsnelisi Area Discussed in Ergneti
November 2019
Georgian authorities and the EUMM strongly denied reports by the de facto government of South Ossetia of alleged shootings near the occupation line at Koda.51Agenda.ge, 7 November 2019, Tbilisi, EUMM deny de facto Tskhinvali reports on shooting at occupation line52Civil Georgia, 7 November 2019, EUMM: No Shots Fired in Koda Village Near Dividing Line According to them a violent confrontation took place between local villagers and Georgian authorities. Locals interviewed by Radio Tavisupleba denied such a thing took place.53Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 6 November 2019, საოკუპაციო ძალების მძიმე სამშენებლო ტექნიკა ხურვალეთში Below statement by the South Ossetian KGB illustrated the attempt to sow division between the local Georgians and their authorities, spreading disinformation:54RES Agency, 8 November 2019, KGB of South Ossetia declares the threat of armed clash on the state border with Georgia
“Information received by State Security Committee of Republic of South Ossetia indicates that near the border with South Ossetia in Koda on 5 November automatic weapons were associated with an armed incident between the Georgian Interior Ministry and the local Georgian population.
The cause of the conflict was discontent of Koda residents with the reinforced checkpoints of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia in the area of Chorchana-Kobi-Koda-Atotsi, a general escalation of tension, as well as attempts by Georgian police officers to establish Georgian flags at the heights prevailing over the village.”
An interview on South Ossetian press agency RES with Yuri Vazagov, the head of the Information and Analytical Office of the Presidential Administration, illustrated the confrontational stance in South Ossetia.55RES Agency, 17 November 2019, Vazagov on the situation in Uista: maintain a principled and consistent position He recommended a principled position on the territorial issue, including “strengthening the borders”, while he voiced explicit accusations against the European monitors. During his European trip South Ossetia’s de-facto minister of Foreign Affairs Dmitry Medoev said that international peacekeepers are a closed chapter since the 2008 war, referring to the Tsnelisi crisis.56RES Agency, 14 November 2019, A question on peacekeepers in South Ossetia is closed after Saakashvili’s aggression: Foreign Minister
December 2019
In a bold move, South Ossetian de facto President Anatoly Bibilov inspected the South Ossetian police post on the so-called “944.8 height” near Chorchana,57RES Agency, 19 December 2019, Anatoly Bibilov inspected the border post in the region of Uista which is located on Tbilisi administered territory. By that moment, Georgian authorities effectively lost control over this height. The so-called “creeping annexation” could not get more explicit. But a new chapter was added after New Year.
January 2020
On 14 January 2020 South Ossetian forces reportedly started erecting “illegal installations” (fences) in the Chorchana forests.58Civil Georgia, 14 January 2020, Security Service Reports on Illegal ‘Borderization’ on Tbilisi-Controlled Territory They followed the line that is the “real border” of South Ossetia according to Tskhinvali (see red line in map above). In other words, unilateral annexation of territory. A hardly surprising move given the recent past. David Katsarava visualized the borderization works in the forested hills with a drone:59Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 14 January 2020, ბორდერიზაციის ახალი ტალღა ჩორჩანის ტყეში
Meanwhile South Ossetian propaganda was spinning things completely different: “a Georgian state drone violated airspace”.60RES Agency, 15 January 2020, Грузинский беспилотник нарушил границу Южной Осетии, – заявление КГБ Subsequently Georgian authorities closed media and civil society access to the area by blocking the road at Brolosani. A few days later the Georgian State Security Service reported that borderization works were resumed at both the Chorchana area and the Gugutiantkari village (link to the main page on this subject).61Civil Georgia, 21 January 2020, Georgia Security Service: Occupying Forces Continue Fencing on Tbilisi-Controlled Territory
Trees
Georgian activists geo-located the marked trees which the EUMM reported about in September 2019, but observed already in January 2019.62Facebook, 19 January 2020, Post by Davit Katsarava63Agenda.ge, 16 September 2019, EUMM reports details of current tension at Tskhinvali occupation line The EUMM did not identify publicly who was responsible for the markings. However, the Georgian activists drew their conclusions on who did and with which intentions in Tbilisi controlled territory.
US acting Ambassador stated in relation to the borderization initiatives: “I believe that all resources must be used to settle the issue, including the Geneva International Discussions. The US firmly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and urges Russia to fulfill the ceasefire agreement signed with Georgia in 2008 [and withdraw its forces from the Georgian territory]”.64Agenda.ge, 20 January 2020, US concerned by erection of new barriers by occupation forces on Tbilisi-controlled territory
Akhalgori checkpoint
The checkpoint near Odzisi (Mosabruni) in Akhalgori district remained closed all this time. South Ossetian de facto President Anatoly Bibilov reiterated the condition for reopening, at a reporting meeting of the Russian FSB Border Administration in January 2020.65RES Agency, 17 January 2020, Позиция руководства Южной Осетии заключается в общих правилах для всех жителей, – Бибилов This checkpoint is the most important of three, with up to 400-500 civilian crossings on a daily basis. It reopened shortly at the end of January 2020 only to allow pensioners to collect their Georgian pension, closing again 10 days later. It was scheduled to reopen again in March 2020, but it remained closed indefinitely due to the COVID-19 outbreak. More on the checkpoint regime in a separate page.
April 2020
On 16 April the Georgian State Security Service stated in its report that the “occupying forces also used the ongoing incidents near the village of Chorchana to discriminate against ethnic Georgians living in occupied Tskhinvali”.66IPN, 16 April 2020, სუს-ი – საოკუპაციო ძალებმა სოფელ ჩორჩანასთან მიმდინარე მოვლენები ოკუპირებულ ცხინვალში მცხოვრები ეთნიკური ქართველების დისკრიმინაციისთვისაც გამოიყენეს
“Against the background of the active propaganda and disinformation campaign, the de facto regimes have linked the fake news to the restriction of movement on the occupation line. At the beginning of 2019, the so-called The so-called seasonal spread of swine flu (H1N1). To avoid danger, the movement on the occupation line was restricted for 45 days [by South Ossetian authorities]. The so-called Checkpoints and locals were isolated. In September 2019, the occupation regime once again restricted free movement on the occupation line, this time by the central government to “worsen” the security situation and link it to the developments in Chorchana. Occupying forces have been actively covering misinformation about the village of Chorchana. As part of the targeted information campaign, the occupation forces spread false news, including the mobilization of additional police forces from Tbilisi and the confrontation between the police and the population”.
May 2020
During a Geneva International Discussions (GID) video conference on 13 May 2020 the de facto South Ossetian authorities reiterated “the need to withdraw the Georgian police post illegally placed near the village of Uista (Tsnelisi)”.67RES Agency, 13 May 2020, It is necessary to remove the illegal post of the Georgian police in the village of Uista, – Plenipotentiary
Disinformation by South Ossetian side
On 20 May 2020 the South Ossetian KGB released a statement accusing the EUMM mission of facilitating “Georgian side’s plans to collect biological samples in South Ossetia by illegally moving South Ossetian citizens across the state border line”, connecting this with an alleged Georgian genocidal policy and the Lugar biolab in Tbilisi:68RES Agency, 21 May 2020, An external security threat to South Ossetia is the transfer of a dangerous infection from Georgia, – KGB
“The KGB of South Ossetia reported on Wednesday that the direct continuation of the South Ossetian genocide policy at the present stage is the activities in Georgia of the so-called “R. Lugar Research Center for Public Health.”, whose representatives continue the attempts to take biological material from citizens of the Republic of South Ossetia.”
It further claimed that the EUMM patrol “accompanying the Private vehicles” were part of this covert plot providing a disguise:
“The KGB has noted that, according to objective control data, both times “Private” vehicles were accompanied by two EUMM patrol cars, which ensured the secret movement of the Georgian doctors to the state border line, their disguise, protection and departure in the opposite direction.”
This allegedly happened at two locations on 26 April 2020: near the quarry and Georgian police post just outside of Tsnelisi and at a height between Chorchana and Kobe villages.
Response by the EUMM
The EUMM strongly refuted these allegations as “malicious and irresponsible disinformation”, stating that the accompanying vehicles were legitimate ambulances used for many years, with full knowledge of the de facto South Ossetian authorities.69EUMM, 21 May 2020, Countering disinformation about EUMM Georgia activities along the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia on 26 April
“Reports that appeared in South Ossetian media focusing on the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research in Georgia on 20 May 2020, made inaccurate and completely false references to the activities of the EU Monitoring Mission ( EUMM) in Georgia along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with South Ossetia on 26 April.
Categorically denying the false claims which are yet another example of malicious and irresponsible disinformation targeted at the Mission, we state the following:
On 26 and 27 April the Mission responded to Hotline activations regarding enquiries about ‘private vehicles’ that accompanied its patrol. In response, the Mission explained, as it does here, that the named vehicles were ambulances.
Ambulance cars have been present with EUMM patrols since its inception. They are a standard precautionary measure. It is part of our duty of care towards our staff that they accompany EUMM personnel so that they can swiftly provide the necessary help in case of need, such as a car accident. This is particularly important in remote areas where speedy medical support is difficult to obtain.
The ambulance was clearly visible. There was no secretive movement. The patrol was conducted as planned. There was no contact with any persons. There was no collection of any samples and there is no intent to do so. EUMM is a monitoring Mission, it monitors every day, including during the COVID pandemic.”
Activists of Power in Unity determined on 30 May 2020 more marked trees in the Chorchana forests, allegedly in preparation of further borderization of the Tbilisi controlled area that South Ossetia claims and attempts to occupy. The State Security Service saying in a statement “every provocative act is being responded to”.70Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 30 May 2020, ოკუპანტები საფუძველს ამზადებენ ჩორჩანის ტყის მისატაცებლად71IPN, 30 May 2020, სუს-ი ჩორჩანასთან ოკუპანტების მიერ ახალი ნიშნულების გაკეთების შესახებ ინფორმაციას ეხმაურება და აცხადებს, რომ „პროვოკაციული ქმედების თითოეულ ფაქტზე რეაგირება ხორციელდება“ Davit Katsarava of Power in Unity commented: “We were in the Chorchana-Perevi forest massif, in the territory controlled by our government, which is probably no longer under our control. Today we have already found new landmarks that are moving in the direction of Perevi. It can be said that we followed the occupants on wet tracks. We found a special trap on one of the sections of the road, which was designed to detect if a stranger passed by on this section.” More video images and an interview can be found at VOA (in Georgian).72VOA Georgia, 30 May 2020, ჩორჩანასთან უფრო მეტი ტერიტორიის დაკარგვის საფრთხეა
Summer 2020
In line with propaganda and disinformation developments during the Covid-19 crisis, the de facto South Ossetian authorities accused Georgia of biowarfare activities through its Lugar biolab in combination with drones.73RES Agency, 4 June 2020, KGB of South Ossetia reported the violation of airspace of the Republic by Georgian drones In a typical propaganda stint in line with this disinformation the KGB of South Ossetia performed “chemical & biological reconnaissance” in the area of Tsnelisi.74RES Agency, 4 June 2020, KGB of South Ossetia is conducting chemical and biological reconnaissance of the Georgian border UAV violation zones After Georgia performed drone flights near Seribalta and the Yugostalk plant above Tbilisi administered territory (which SO contested was above theirs), the KGB commented:
“The Committee has noted that, in particular, the employees of the Radiation and Chemical-Biological Protection Unit of the RSO KGB Border Service selected “soil, water, air, green cover, and various insects in order to further study them in the laboratory conditions.
In connection with the outbreak in Georgia, in addition to the Covid-19 pandemic of the Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever, as well as experiments carried out at the Lugar laboratory with bats and insects, the KGB of the Republic responsibly declares that if pathogenic microflora or disease vectors are detected in the samples taken, this fact will indicate the use of forms and methods of bioterrorism by the Tbilisi regime against South Ossetia.”

During a video conference between the new head of the EUMM, Marek Schigol, and South Ossetian delegates Yegor Kochiev and Murat Dzhioev, all participants reiterated the importance of the IPRM format. The regular and full-length meetings were not held since August 2019. However, the South Ossetian side maintained its position on the Georgian police post near Tsnelisi and the Yugostalk plant as an obstacle for progress.75RES Agency, 4 June 2020, South Ossetia has drawn the EUMM attention to the border incidents Obviously, the police post hindered South Ossetia in annexing the territory it claims.
New Georgian police post or not?
The South Ossetian KGB reported on 16 June 2020, that a Georgian police post was constructed in the northeastern forested outskirts of Chorchana village.76RES Agency, 17 June 2020, The KGB of South Ossetia announced an increase in provocations and regular aerial reconnaissance of UAVs by Georgia (English translation dated 17 June, Russian version 16 June) There was no official reaction on this from Georgian authorities.
“The State Security Committee has noted that in the northeastern outskirts of the settlement of Chorchana a new post of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia has been constructed, the object is located in a forest belt, and at least five police officers are registered there.”
Georgian press agency IPN and others took notice of the Ossetian claims.77IPN, 16 June 2020, ოკუპირებული ცხინვალის დე ფაქტო უშიშროების კომიტეტი ჩორჩანასთან ქართული მხარის დამატებითი საპოლიციო პუნქტის გახნის შესახებ იუწყება However, reports by Radio Tavisupleba based on Power in Unity civil patrols and experts indicated the matter was malign disinformation of the South Ossetian side to provoke further escalation.78Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 17 June 2020, ახალი დეზინფორმაცია ჩორჩანა-წნელისის კრიზისზე, ანალიტიკოსები ესკალაციის საფრთხის მოლოდინში
Teona Akubardia, a former deputy secretary of the Security Council of Georgia and a security analyst said: “The first goal is to raise the temperature of this community and, despite the pandemic, to maintain a constant high temperature in relation to this community. The users of this topic, first of all, are the internal audience, the population living in the occupied region of Tskhinvali. The second direction is to put pressure on the Georgian government and ignore these issues during the pre-election period. The risks, of course, are for the national security of the country. “
Impact of civil patrols of Power in Unity
The South Ossetian KGB frequently mentioned the activities of Power in Unity, which identified “marked trees” near Chorchana (see above). They went so far to give a positive assessment of the group in their propaganda against the Georgian government. In July 2020, the KGB said the group carried out “constructive activities to cover the border situation and providing Georgian citizens with reliable information on crossing the South Ossetian-Georgian state border on the ground”.79RES Agency, 8 July 2020, T=Representatives of the Georgian NGOs have collected data on the South Ossetian-Georgian border, the KGB of South Ossetia reports
The Georgian activists said [Russian] “occupation forces” marked these as a precursor to further borderization in Tbilisi controlled territory. The South Ossetian de facto security authorities however twisted this around: they claimed the marked trees are a precursor to Georgian activities in the area they claim is theirs. Referring to 2019 when tree markings were “observed” followed by construction of a Georgian police post:
“So, on the state border section, in the area of the village of Uista (Tsnelis), the Georgian side is trying to simulate the situation that preceded the unlawful post of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs in August 2019. In a forest located in the area of the village of Chorchana of the Khashur municipality are recorded marks and symbols made by paint on trees. In 2019, the Tbilisi regime, before the start of the “Tsnelis crisis,” held a similar event, presenting the marking of the area as an activity of the Border Service of the RSO KGB, after which the illegal post of the Georgian law enforcement agencies was installed”.80RES Agency, 17 June 2020, The KGB of South Ossetia announced an increase in provocations and regular aerial reconnaissance of UAVs by Georgia
On 20 June 2020 the Georgian opposition leaning Mtavari TV channel joined a civil patrol of the Power in Unity group in the forested areas of Chorchana (video in Georgian only).81Mtavari Arkhi TV, 21 June 2020, ახალ ნიშნულები ჩორჩანას ტყეში – “მთავარი არხის” ექსპედიცია
Fall 2020
At the end of November the head of the South Ossetian delegation at the Geneva discussions, Murat Dzhioev, reaffirmed the South Ossetian demand that any discussion about “border security” can only be preceded by the removal of the police post near Tsnelisi by the Georgian side.82RES Agency, 27 November 2020, The removal of the Georgian post in the village of Uista will serve to normalize the situation at the state border, – the Plenipotentiary This statement was made as warmup to the Geneva International Discussions on 10 and 11 December, the first in a year.
February 2021
On 9 February 2021 the South Ossetian “KGB” reported the alleged “appearance on the territory adjacent of Tsnelisi military personnel and subdivisions of the Intelligence Department of the Georgian Defense Forces, as well as special operations forces”.83RES Agency, 9 February 2021, KGB of South Ossetia reported on the intelligence activities of Georgia near the borders According to the statement, the forces were to commit sabotage on the territory of South Ossetia, without providing any (visual) evidence:
“According to available information, Georgian military intelligence officers located in the border zone are conducting surveillance, carrying out search operations in the border area, and also practicing elements of a raid and penetration into the territory of South Ossetia with the aim of committing various sabotages, including under the guise of Russian servicemen”.
A few days later the KGB shared more details, claiming the frequent activation of electronic border monitoring systems. They alleged that on “7 February at 17.50 on the left flank of the settlement of [Tsnelisi]” the alarm system was activated. Local “border guards revealed traces of the violator in the direction of the Georgian settlement of Kobi”. The KGB went on to accuse Georgia of sending saboteurs “into the sectors of influence of South Ossetian units, creating a real threat of direct clashes”.84RES Agency, 11 February 2021, KGB of South Ossetia has announced the attempt to infiltrate the border zone of the Georgian police officer
Spring 2021
At the 99th IPRM meeting in Ergneti on 27 April, the Tsnelisi-Chorchana dispute was raised by the South Ossetian side in light of the ongoing closure of the crossing points of the occupation line. The South Ossetian delegation leader Yegor Kochiev reiterated removal of the “illegal [Georgian] post” is crucial to any other progress.85RES Agency, 28 April 2021, Border provocations, drones and Uista: Yegor Kochiev on some results of the IPRM meeting
“Moreover, the Georgian party, including international representatives, is activating the issue of facilitating the crossing of the state border at the places of simplified admission. As it is known, the checkpoints were closed in response to the setting up of the illegal Georgian post in the Uista [Tsnelisi] area. And the first step in resolving this situation will be the removal of this illegal post from the territory of South Ossetia. I think after this step the issues of simplified border crossing and other pressing humanitarian issues will be resolved.”
For the Georgian government nor the EUMM this was a particular talking point. The EUMM emphasized the need to address the negative impact of the closed crossing points.86Civil Georgia, 28 April 2021, 99th IPRM Held in Ergneti87EUMM, 27 April 2021, 99th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting takes place in Ergneti
June 2021
According to the South Ossetian represantives, the issue of the Georgian police post near Tsnelisi was raised again at the 53rd Geneva International Discussion on 29-30 June 2021.88RES Agency, 7 July 2021, Détente of the situation in Uista is a guarantee of creating security along the entire perimeter of the border – Dzhioev Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy of South Ossetia Murat Dzhioev commented that in order to create a “secure system along the entire perimeter of the border”, the Georgian post should be removed. So far nothing new. According to Georgian reporting, the matter was not a priority talking point at the meetings.89Civil Georgia, 1 July 2021, 53rd Round of Geneva International Discussions
Dzhioev claimed a delegation of the GID co-chairs visited Uista/Tsnelisi upon invitation of the South Ossetian side to see for themselves how close the Georgian observation post is. According to him, local residents were able to express their concern about the situation, “they talked about the danger of the shots fired there”. He also noted OSCE representatives drove a few days later to the Georgian police post by car from (Georgian) Chorchana. “They could see that post is located at a great distance from the Georgian village, almost 4 km” Dzhioev suggested the post is unreasonably far from Chorchana (to protect Georgian citizens) and is in his view intended to intimidate the residents of South Ossetia.
December 2021
The Georgian police post near Tsnelisi was raised again by the South Ossetian side during the 55th Geneva International Discussions on 7 and 8 December 2021, without further action.90RES Agency, 9 December 2021, In Geneva, the delegation of South Ossetia raised the issue of illegal post in the village of Uista91Civil Georgia, 9 December 2021, 55th Round of Geneva International Discussions Related to that, the South Ossetian delegation pointed out to the participants the “need for delimitation and subsequent demarcation of the border between the Republic of South Ossetia and Georgia”. No progress was made on the file however.
The 200 km² South Ossetia claims to be missing
The South Ossetian parliamentary Commission on Delimitation and Demarcation of Borders alleged in a report presented on 1 December 2021 that South Ossetia is missing over more than 200 square kilometer territory, which is under Georgian control.92RES Agency, 1 December 2021, Депутаты парламента Южной Осетии заслушали информацию о работе госкомиссии по госгранице The commission
“… requested the minutes of the meetings and materials of the work of the previous members of the commission, but the documents were not presented. The commission formed a working group to study the cartographic characteristics of the state border, which presented the results of the work to the commission. The information provided by the working group indicates a critical discrepancy between the state border line (.. .) This discrepancy is more than 200 square kilometers to the detriment of the legitimate territorial interests of the republic.”
The head of the Commission, Garry Muldarov, also noted
“… that the applied cartographic characteristics were compared with the data on the administrative boundary of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the Georgian SSR, which are recorded in Decree No. 2 of the All-Georgian Central Executive Committee of Soviets and the Council of the People’s Commissars of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia ‘On the formation of the autonomous region of South Ossetia’, dated [20] April 1922. The Decree is the basic normative act defining the borders of the Republic of South Ossetia, which is the legal successor of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region.”
The commission visualized the findings in a Google Earth mapping of the so far maintained border and the additional discrepancies it found, zooming in on various specific locations. As for the Tsnelisi-Chorchana area, the commission alleged that a much larger area should be allocated to South Ossetia, with its western border running much wider to the West.

After this report the Parliament decided to initiate a parliamentary investigation to “find out who is to blame for this”.93RES Agency, 1 December 2021, В парламенте Южной Осетии решили создать комиссию депутатского расследования по границе All deputies were included in the investigative commission. It was suggested the hearings will include “the participation of representatives of the former commissions on the state border.”
Political dispute on findings border commission
At the end of 2021, a heated debate on the “border issues” took place in the South Ossetian parliament.94RES Agency, 30 December 2021, Вопросы госграницы вызвали бурные споры на сессии парламента Южной Осетии Chairman Amiran Dyakonov of the parliamentary State Border Commission noted “that the border of South Ossetia, which is designated in the current reality, does not correspond to the borders determined by the decree on the formation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region”.
He also noted that the boundaries were determined in 1922, which, according to him, is confirmed by archival documents reflected in the work of the previous commission. He added that it requires the president of the republic and the executive branch to take specific measures to protect the territorial interests and state security of the RSO. “If you remove the 1922 decree, then there is no normative act that would define the state borders of South Ossetia”.
De facto president Bibilov, did not want to take the blame for any alleged inaction, as he was not a member of the commissions or a member of the government in those years when the borders were being determined. Bibilov said he created the commission on delimitation and demarcation of borders, but he was never invited to the meetings. He confronted the present politicians with their own inactivity during a decade.
Also, he (rightly) noted that since 1922, the focus of the commission, the border was changed multiple times under Soviet rule. That Russia recognized the republic in 2008 with the existing borders at that moment, inherited from the last border status of the Soviet-era oblast, as well as the consequences of correcting the border to the alleged status of 1922, losing villages:
“Since 1922, changes have been made regarding the definition of the border line. Subsequently, Russia recognized our independence with the existing borders, there is an agreement that was not adopted under the current government. Your activity was related to the issue of state borders, but at one time not one of you spoke about this problem, the village of Tsnelis(i), did not defend the rights of the people, did not raise these problems before the ex-president, but simply thought about how to get rich and create a business. When the agreement was signed in 2009, why did they not raise this issue, why was the ombudsman silent? People who yesterday were obliged to determine the boundaries, for some reason, only today they talk about them”.
“The head of the commission must report on his activities to the head of state, but he has never done this. If any work has been done, then they should invite the president to the meeting and report on the work done, and then I would definitely come, but such a proposal has never been received. In addition, the commission is illegitimate because it worked without a position. They designed it and sent it in, we tweaked it and brought it back. Since then it has disappeared, we have not received it back. At today’s borders, I have put border guards to guard them. Did any of you go to them and ask what conditions they work in? No. You only know how to shout”.
According to Bibilov, if the border is marked according to the 1922 decree, then the villages of Gujabar and Orchosan would remain outside of South Ossetia.
Spring 2022
After the fruitless 105th Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting on 4 March 2022, South Ossetian representative Egor Kochiev said in Ossetian media the “main issue [for Tskhinvali] remains the Georgian police checkpoint in the village of Chorchana, which poses a threat to the population of Uista [Tsnelisi]”. He added, “South Ossetia can open state border checkpoints in the Razdakhani district [checkpoint on the way back to Akhalgori]”.95Radio Tavisupleba RFE/RL, 7 March 2022, ახალგორის გახსნა ჩორჩანის საგუშაგოს სანაცვლოდ – ოსური მხარე კომპრომისზე ალაპარაკდა
The Georgian authorities said they do not intend to dismantle the Chorchana checkpoint. They believe the police checkpoint guarantees stability and security on the spot. To be continued.
Fall 2022
Throughout 2022 there were no major developments surrounding the Chorchana dispute, apart from frequently tabled at the scheduled conflict mediation meetings. The dispute remained a stalemate in a status quo situation. Georgian civil monitors recorded new material in October 2022 (see video below), which confirmed the de facto annexation by Russian controlled forces of Georgian administered territory and the solidification of a new boundary. The South Ossetian side – under Russian command – developed and strengthened over time the infrastructure of the new occupation line.
Video by Power in Unity of October 2022. The left image shows the same location as in the video, two years earlier in June 2020. The image on the right shows another point along the Chorchana occupation line in November 2022.
Winter 2023
In February 2023 the South Ossetian president Alan Gagloev visited the disputed area in light of the 18th birthday of the South Ossetian Border Service.96RES Agency, 3 March 2023, Alan Gagloev visited the border guards serving on the Tsnelis section of the South Ossetian-Georgian border The head of the border guard service said that in this section of the border information signs were installed, that they are in complete control of the area and that there is a direct connection with the border guards of the Russian FSB.
IPRM March 2023
At the 111th IPRM meeting on 3 March 2023 the head of the South Ossetian delegation, Egor Kochiev, said they were
“concerned about the recent incident in the area [of Tsnelisi/Uista] , when the Georgian side used an armored personnel carrier to deliver food to the post. We received an exhaustive answer, it was noted that due to the lack of roads, they were forced to resort to this type of transport – a car with increased cross-country ability. At the same time, weapons were removed from the armored personnel carrier and it was used as an all-terrain vehicle”.
He also said the six weeks since the last meeting was “the calmest period”. According to Kochiev
“during this period not a single violation of the state border from the Georgian side was recorded, there was a minimum number of incidents related to the flights of unmanned aerial vehicles, there were no violations of the state border by representatives of the Georgian security agencies – police or other armed people. I hope that this trend will continue, and violations near the state border or related to violations of the border itself will decrease. I would like to hope that not only weather conditions contributed to the decrease in the number of violators, but this may also be due to the active preventive work on the Georgian side.”97RES Agency, 3 March 2023, “The calmest period”: Egor Kochiev on the situation at the border since the previous meeting in the IPRM format
Spring 2023
In May 2023 a Russian BTR-80 armored vehicle was spotted in the South Ossetian controlled village Tsnelisi, in a yard that directly faces the occupation line, next to the river Lamushuristskali.
Spring 2024
During 2023 the topic remained on the agenda for the IPRM meetings, without any resolution. The South Ossetian de facto authorities maintained their position Georgia needs to evacuate the police point near Tsnelisi / Uista and maintained the police point is on their territory.98RES Agency, 12 September 2023, South Ossetia has called on Georgia to resolve the issue of the illegal post in the village of Uista through diplomatic means The South Ossetian authorities repeated that in spring 2024.99RES Agency, 21 March 2024, South Ossetia will continue to demand the removal of the Georgian post from the territory of the Republic – Egor Kochiev In April 2024 the South Ossetian KGB reported “small arms fire on Georgian territory adjacent to Uista”, calling it provocations from the Georgian side.100RES Agency, 17 April 2024, The KGB of South Ossetia reported provocations on the state border of the Republic with Georgia
April 2025
For a year not much was reported on the Chorchana dispute, until the Georgian parliamentary “investigative commission on the government of 2003-2012” (the Saakashvili-era UNM government) put the subject on their agenda and summoned both former prime minister Giorgi Gakharia and former domestic minister Vakhtang Gomelauri to be questioned about the matter. Gomelauri was head of the State Security Service until September 2019, when he succeeded Gakharia as minister of domestic affairs.
Gakharia, who moved to the opposition in 2021 and subsequently was called a traitor by his former colleagues in the ruling Georgian Dream, was questioned on 14 April 2025.101Civil Georgia, 14 April 2025, Gakharia Appears Before GD Parliamentary Investigative Commission He explained the rationale behind building the police post that triggered the crisis and de facto annexation of Georgian controlled land by Russian and South Ossetian forces. It had become harder to patrol the forested area, while Georgian villagers were frequently abducted in the area and new “border” signs of the occupation forces had appeared in the area.
Gakharia: it was all about South Ossetia’s planned annexation
Commission member Aleksandre Tabatadze, a former deputy head of the state security service, suggested the police post was not coordinated with the government and that the security service was against it. Gakharia on the other head claimed the move was coordinated with the EUMM mission, government bodies as well as the ministry of infrastructure. He also emphasized the strategic need for the observation post, as South Ossetia already pushed territorial claims on the area of 1800 hectares based on a “fake map from 1922” (see above), plotting plans for seizure.
“[Anatoly Bibilov’s] election campaign was based on the idea that if [Eduard] Kokoity brought us independence, I need to expand the borders of the separatist region. For this expansion, he was using exactly that 1922 map, which they first used to approach Chorchana.”
Head of the commission Tea Tsulukiani was unimpressed with Gakharia’s explanation and accused him of telling lies. She also claimed he bypassed protocols by not informing the state security service on building the observation post. Tsulukiani argued the goal of constructing the post, to prevent territorial expansion by South Ossetia, had backfired. Gakharia responded with sarcasm: “At the pace you’re going, soon you’ll be blaming me for starting a war”.
June 2025
Vakhtang Gomelauri, head of the State Security Service between July and September 2019 and subsequently the minister of Internal Affairs at the time of the Chorchana conflict, was summoned on 15 June 2025 before the Georgian parliamentary “investigative commission on the government of 2003-2012” (the Saakashvili-era UNM government) to discuss as witness his and Gakharia’s (see above) role in the conflict.102Civil Georgia, 14 June 2025, Gakharia in Prosecution Crosshairs Over 2019 Chorchana Tensions Gomelauri stated he was never consulted and that “of course I was against [opening an observation post], of course it should not have been done”.
He also declared he contacted Gakharia at the time as soon as he learned about the construction and told it “it couldn’t be done. It could escalate the conflict. Luckily, we averted it. The country lost hundreds of hectares of forests and pastures, but that was the best outcome. It could provoke a war”. 103Sakartvelos Ambebi, 14 June 2025, Gakharia in Prosecution Crosshairs Over 2019 Chorchana Tensions
July 2025
Giorgi Gakharia was summoned on 2 July 2025 to the Tsulukiani commission for a second time. He was allowed to attend remotely from Germany where he was at that moment.104Civil Georgia, 4 July 2025, Gakharia Defends Chorchana Checkpoint to Tsulukiani Commission as GD Revisits its Legacy The session was solely focussed on the Chorchana crisis, after the commission’s interviews with Gomelauri and Grigol Liluashvili. The latter was the head of the State Security Service from September 2019, as successor to Gomelauri.
Original plan and alleged sabotage
Gakharia rebutted Gomelauri’s statements and reiterated his previous explanation on the crisis. The police post was necessary in his view to ensure that the Georgian authorities and the EUMM would be able to patrol the area without hindrance, and to “establish effective control over Georgian territory”. Gakharia made the case that work on the plan started in late 2018, when he was still interior minister, involving both the interior ministry as well as the State Security Service. According to Gakharia, the EUMM was informed about the plan to create a total of seven police posts. The implementation of the plan started on 24 August 2019.
Gakharia said this was disrupted, possibly deliberately sabotaged, by Gomelauri, when Gakharia was promoted to prime minister in the same period. Head of the State Security Service Gomelauri was promoted to succeed Gakharia as interior minister and Grigol Liluashvili became Gomelauri’s successor in the security service.
On the day of his confirmation as Prime Minister, on 8 September 2019, the Russian and South Ossetian troops created outposts on the coordinates the Georgian plan envisioned for their own police posts. Gakharia implied Gomelauri and Liluashvili deliberately undermined the original plan during the transition period. Gomelauri admitted in the commission he was against the plan from the start. Nonetheless, Georgian Dream and the Tsulukiani Commission held Gakharia accountable to the loss of territory. Gakharia maintained that if the plan would have been executed as envisioned, Georgia would have maintained control over the territory.
September 2025
The South Ossetian side responded with “hope” after the Georgian leadership in their view “admitted the police post was a mistake”, while persecuting Gakharia for it. After the IPRM meeting in Ergneti on 29 September 2025, the South Ossetian delegation said there are “serious hopes that this Georgian post will be removed and withdrawn from South Ossetian territory”.105Ekho Kavkaza, 29 September 2025, В Цхинвали после заявлений «Мечты» надеются на демонтаж поста полиции в Цнелиси Some in Georgia argue this acknowledgement would create the ground of further de facto annexation of the Chorchana forest, the northern part where the Georgian police posts basically obstruct the annexation of the forest the South Ossetians claim.






















The Ossetians operate as proxies of the Russians, specifically Surkov. The Russian operation is GRU-led and should be read as the continuation of the kinetic operations of 2008 by the full spectrum of active measures in the “grey zone” of the Swedish analtyical model of hybrud warfare. The artillery recce company of the GRU razvedka battalion produce topquality computer -generated maps – with the boundaries anywhere required.